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To those whom I love 
iv 
I went in search of my art, often in danger of my life. 
I have not been ashamed to learn those things which to me have 
seemed useful—even from vagabond, barbers and executioners. 
For we know how a lover will go a long way to meet the woman 
that he loves. How much the more, then, will the lover of 
wisdom be tempted to go in search of his divine mistress— 
Paracelcus 
INTRODUCTION 
With the concepts of "Scientific Management" beginning to 
take shape with the revolutionary ideas of Fredric S. Taylor, 
management is becoming increasingly conscious of quantifica-
tion. A qualitative approach to a problem is being replaced 
by a quantitative and mathematical procedure. 
According to Taylor, "Scientific Management" is management 
based on measurement plus control. Controls can be no better 
than the measurements upon which they are based, and, without 
some kind of measurement, control is impossible. Many manage-
ments find this out the hard way—they go bankrupt. 
That business with the best control of costs will survive; 
that with relatively poor cost control will go under. The 
recorded history of mankind is one of bankruptcies of nations. 
Nationalism has always followed the "law of the jungle," with 
the inevitable result that the high cost producers among nations 
have succumbed to the low cost producers, just as the inefficient 
corner grocery store has succumbed to the super-market. 
The "survival of the fittest" is still ruling strong in the 
twentieth century, weeding out the weak, diseased and unhealthy. 
However, from a different viewpoint, the weak and the unhealthy 
are not the ones diminutive in form or structure, but the ones 
who have failed to keep pace with the changing era. 
There have been rapid advances in the field of communication 
and technology, and those concerns which have not updated them-
selves, but adhered to methods, procedures and policies of days 
gone by soon put up signs of "Going out of business." 
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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Why Small Business 
Small business is considered primarily because any activity 
must start from stages of infancy: man grows from a child; huge 
empires and civilizations are built from small groups of people; 
elementary ideas and notions germinate into intricate and complex 
thought processes; modern giant industries of today were small 
business of yesterday. 
Secondarily, small business is part of the American heritage. 
The legislators responsible for devising United States govern-
ment's assistance to small business in its existing forms did 
not envision spending large sums with no recognisable future. 
Their efforts to aid, counsel and assist were aimed at preserving 
"free competitive enterprise." In any appraisal of the condi-
tions prerequisite to the growth and survival of a system of 
private enterprise, the role of small enterprise is a strategic 
factor. It is natural, in thinking of American industry, to be 
impressed with large scale operations; but these corporate 
giants did not start full grown, nor can they stand alone. 
Large-scale industries are fed by and feed thousands of smaller 
suppliers and customers that link the chain from raw materials 
to consumers. 
Collectively small business might be termed as the "biggest 
business" in America. They make up more than 4,500,000 of 
4,700,000 businesses, employ about 30 million people, and account 
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for about forty percent of the total business activity. Nearly 
one out of every two persons employed in the United States today 
is either owner, manager or worker in a small business. 
Virile, competitive small businesses are a safeguard against 
concentration of political and economic power and consequent 
loss of individual freedoms, including freedom of the ambitious 
to risk capital in a venture of their own. 
Still another and major reason is the essentiality of small 
business concerns in times of national emergency. During World 
War II, for example, small businesses manufactured some 30 per-
cent of the war production. If another war should come, the 
larger plants almost certainly would be among the first targets 
of an enemy aggressor. In that event, small plants might well 
have to produce an even greater share of the needs than in the 
past. 
Definition of Small Business 
We have dealt at length with the indispensibility of the 
"small business" in relation to the total economy, but the in-
evitable question arises, "What is a small business?" 
Many attempts have been made and are presently being made 
to define "small business" in explicit terms, but the task is 
not a simple one. Narrowing it down in terms of number of 
employees is not adequate. A steel rolling mill employing 950 
workers, for example, is a 'small' firm in its industry, whereas 
a cheese factory with 250 employees is relatively large as 
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compared to other firms engaged in the same activity. Hence 
the Small Business Administration has set several breaking 
points between large and small manufacturing firms, varying 
with the type of industry and ranging from 250 to 1000 employees. 
This is in conformance with the Small Business Act of 1953. 
Which states a small business as one which is not dominant in 
its field of operation. 
In classifying wholesalers as "small business", Small 
Business Administration uses annual sales of $5 million or less, 
for construction concerns $7.5 million, for retailers $1 million, 
and for service industries $1 million. 
In "small business" management is independent and usually 
managers are owners. Area of operations is mainly local, though 
markets need not be local. This conglomeration of definitions 
place 95 percent of American business in the "small business" 
category. 
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WHY BUSINESSES FAIL? 
Definition of a Business Failure 
Business failures are the result of many divergent factors, 
but before we deal with them we should define a business 
failure. 
A business failure is often used interchangeably with 
bankruptcy, but bankruptcies are those businesses wherein 
individuals have actually filed petitions under the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act. Inasmuch as bankruptcy statistics refer to 
individuals who are not in business as well as those who are, 
it is necessary to eliminate the former before the figures can 
make much sense. The important point is that many failing 
businesses do not file under the Bankruptcy Act. 
Others refer to "business discontinuances" as the answer to 
the question, but the number of situations that can be so clas-
sified is a far from accurate gauge of conditions as reflected 
in the number of business failures. Business, for example, may 
be discontinued because of death, better opportunities elsewhere, 
a change in the family situation, the need to move to a different 
location, or simple boredom. 
Hence a commercial failure is one in which a business has 
ceased operation following bankruptcy or assignment for the 
benefit of creditors, or which has ceased operation with a loss 
to creditors after such action as execution, foreclosure or 
attachment, or which has been involved in court actions such as 
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receivership, reorganization or arrangement, or which has volun-
tarily compromised their obligation with creditors. 
It should be pointed out that the statistics developed by 
Dun and Bradstreet on this basis include only businesses which 
failed with losses to creditors. Not counted are those failures 
which liquidated voluntarily and paid whatever obligations were 
outstanding at the time they closed their doors. There is of 
course a great deal of such activity going on. Below the rela-
tively stable surface of a business population of about 4.2 
million firms, some 350,000 to 400,000 discontinue business 
every year, only to be replaced by an equal or larger number. 
External and Internal Factors 
In a study which purports to analyze causes of business 
mortality, one must mention that a business failure reflects 
conditions internal and external to the firm. The external 
factors are usually unmanageable by management. They include 
policies of government and natural calamities like wars, fire 
and floods. It is the internal factors that this report is 
primarily concerned with. The variables involved are manipulable 
by management, and only those businesses survive wherein those 
manipulating the variables are thoroughly conversant with them. 
Business failures are caused by incompetence in one form or 
another: inexperience, lack of working capital, the increased 
intensity of competition, changes in the technique of production 
and distribution, changes in styles,fads and habits, the intro-
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duction of substitute products, overtrading and undertrading, the 
personal extravagance of officers or partners and general in-
ability. 
The cause, more than any one other single factor, has been 
considered by many diligent students to be "lack of working 
capital". This cause has been singled out, emphasized and 
delicately played upon in contrast to many other causes, in-
cluding incompetence, mental inertia and inexperience on the 
part of those guiding a business enterprise. 
A few examples will indicate that the finest plant, the 
most meritorious product, the greatest potential market are 
liabilities under a poor management and that the multitude of 
collateral factors is not fundamentally responsible for the 
success or failure of a business enterprise. Other factors help 
or retard progress in a competitive economy, but they are in 
truth on a secondary plane. 
If a business enterprise began operation, for example, on a 
net working capital of $20,000 when a minimum of $50,000 was 
essential at a particular location, was not the very organization 
of that concern with insufficient working capital the result of 
incompetence, inexperience, and poor management and a lack of 
financial knowledge regarding the minimum of working capital 
needed to start operation with a reasonable expectation of 
success? 
On the other hand, if the business began operation with a 
net working capital of $50,000, and in three years losses reduced 
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the excess current assets to $20,000, were not the losses funda-
mentally the result of inefficient or incapable management some-
where along the line? The lack of working capital in either 
instance was but an outward expression of the inexperience or 
the inability of those in charge of the welfare of the particular 
business concern. It was not, in itself, the cause of the 
financial collapse of the enterprise. 
Failures are often said to be due to the increasing intensity 
of competition. With hundreds of thousands more concerns in 
business today than ever before, we are in for a period of bigger 
and better competition, and that is as it should be. If the 
effects of competition are actually beyond the control of busi-
ness management, fatalism would need to be the philosophy of 
business operation. The expenditure of thought energy and con-
scious energy would be largely superfluous. 
Just consider the matter of "extreme competition" for a 
moment. Suppose there were 59 motion-picture theatre supply 
houses in the United States, and that each dealer handled a wide 
variety of supplies for the typical motion-picture theatre, 
projection machine, seats, curtains, carpets, sets, projector 
repair parts, lamps, accessories and carbon. Suppose competition 
became keener and keener, and prices were cut, first on one pro-
duct—carbon—and then on others—projector repair parts, lamps, 
accessories, etc. Profits turned into losses as the gross 
margin on carbon was cut from 30 percent to 10 percent, and the 
gross margin on other important items were also materially 
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reduced. First one concern and then another would liquidate its 
affairs, pay the wages of its employees, its rent, and other 
bills, pull down the shades and close. Finally 39 remain. The 
question is how and what happened? Why were not the entire 59 
concerns forced to liquidate under a condition of"extreme com-
petition"? Why only 20? 
Obviously the 20 which felt the results of keener competition 
were the marginal concerns. The management of the liquidated con-
cerns had lacked the aggressiveness to hold old businesses and 
had failed to acquire new businesses on more profitable col-
lateral ties such as air conditioning and sound equipment which 
could have been sold to the schools and churches. 
The weaker financial business often becomes stronger and 
finally works into a healthy shape under the stress of intense 
competition because that very stress often frees aggressiveness 
and a will to go after and acquire sales on a profitable basis. 
This country is on the brink of entering a period of competition 
the like of which has never been seen before. Managements with 
the greatest ingenuity, keenness and foresight will survive and 
those which lack the competitive instinct, the will to work, and 
ability to create a hard, high-functioning organization will be 
the first to succumb. 
Only where the management is incompetent does a concern go 
under. So is not a business failure which is said to result 
from intense competition generally caused by poor or misguided 
management where inertia has finally played its last leading 
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role? 
Perhaps the financial condition of the concern liquidated 
was not strong enough to stand up against the strain as long as 
the others. Then that financial condition again had been brought 
about by mistakes in policies, by lethargy, by unskilled manage-
ment guidance. If a particular business is started with too 
little funds, that again can be laid only at the doors of the 
owners; and if it becomes weak financially as a result of oper-
ating losses, the management again must accept the responsibility. 
Even failures which are said to be the result of such factors as 
changes in styles, fads and habits may be laid no where except at 
the doorstep of the executive staff. There is no one policy to 
which the real executive gives more serious study and attention 
than just such changes. An aggressive and wide awake management 
generally realizes that changes are taking place behind the 
scenes many months, and at times years, before they come to 
light. Consequently, improvement and changes are made in the 
product well in advance of actual need. 
Less alert executive staffs would have watched their sales 
shrink to the vanishing point and then, when it was too late, 
would have placed the onus on the changing times. Every manu-
facturing or wholesaling business enterprise, and most of the 
larger retailers which have been in existence 25 years or more, 
has had to meet and overcome changes in the demands of customers, 
in manufacturing processes and in the methods of distribution. 
A constant change is in process, a change which is quietly 
taking place in the method of operation of all concerns whose 
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management have a firm grasp on reality. 
This discussion of the causes of business failures indicates 
that most of these causes, whether they are said to be beyond 
the control of management or not, are largely attributable to 
management in one form or another. With this emphasis on the 
extreme importance of the knowledge, skill, experience, and 
aggressiveness of operating management, the principal causes of 
failure fall under two basic classifications: those which are 
manifestations of managerial ineptitude, and those occasional 
instances in which the skill of the management plays little or 
no part. 
Every policy and decision of an executive staff has its 
reflection somewhere in the assets and liabilities of the balance 
sheet, the surplus account, or in the profit and loss statement 
and consequently is disclosed by the healthy or unhealthy pro-
portions of the various assets, liabilities and expenses of a 
business enterprise. The causes of business failures which are 
manifestations of managerial ineptitudes may be evidenced by 
inability to avoid conditions which result in heavy liabilities, 
excessive inventory, top-heavy fixed assets, excessive receivables, 
inadequate sales, heavy operating expenses, poor location or com-
petitive weakness. These conditions are fundamental expressions 
of managerial inefficiency, mental or physical lassitude, or 
rash judgement. 
Each of these conditions in turn may be brought to light by 
one or several secondary factors or symptoms such as poor business 
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conditions, changes in the accepted technique of production and 
distribution, changes in styles and habits, introduction of sub-
stitute products, inadequate budgetry and accounting controls 
etc. 
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FAILURES BY SIZE OF LIABILITIES 
In attempting to bring out the fact that it is the small 
businesses in the main which are susceptible to these managerial 
deficiencies, the liability of a failing concern is considered 
which is indicative of its initial and final financial status. 
An insolvent concern allows debt to accumulate rapidly as 
resources evaporate; hence it is not unusual to see a concern's 
liability at the time of failure mount to the point where it 
exceeds the former net worth by 3-4 times.^ A concern worth 
$25,000 when it was in good financial health might well owe more 
than $100,000 at the time of failure. 
Chart I depicts a breakdown of failures by size of liabil-
ities at the time of failure from 1934 onwards. In the 30's 
and 40's the percentage of failures under $5,000 category is much 
higher than in the range of $25,000-100,000 (the average being 
30 percent and 15 percent respectively); whereas in the past 
decade this trend has shifted to the range of $25,000-100,000 
with an average of 27 percent and with under $5,000 having an 
average of 12 percent. The apparent reason is that today's 
businessman operates under a much greater strain then his 
counterpart did 20-30 years ago. Advances in communication and 
technology in factory, store, and office have speeded up the 
business pace requiring considerably larger initial capital in-
vestment and factual knowledge and business know-how. 
^Duns Review and Modern Industry, Vol. 70, pg. 46. 
Year 
^ $5000 
No % 
5000-
No 
25000 % 25000 No 
-10Q000 % >100,000 No % 
1934 4610 38.1 5340 44.2 1471 12.2 670 5.5 
1935 4992 40.8 5278 43.1 1421 11.6 553 4.5 
1936 3988 41.5 4255 44.3 1042 10.9 322 3.3 
1937 3866 40.8 4349 45.8 988 10.4 287 3.0 
1938 5131 40.0 6026 46.9 1396 10.9 283 2.2 
1939 6522 44.2 6873 46.5 1146 7.8 227 1.5 
1940 6891 50.6 5442 40.0 1067 7.8 219 1.6 
1941 6754 57.0 4116 34.7 815 6.9 163 1.4 
1942 5097 54.2 3525 37.5 660 7.0 123 1.3 
1943 1614 50.1 1272 39.5 269 8.3 65 2.1 
1944 452 37.0 549 44.9 175 14.3 46 3.8 
1945 270 33.4 343 42.4 146 18.0 50 6.2 
1946 263 23.3 488 43.2 252 22.3 126 11.2 
1947 600 17.3 1661 47.8 842 24.2 371 10.7 
1948 846 16.1 2799 53.3 1208 23.0 397 7.6 
1949 1915 20.7 4646 50.3 2147 23.2 538 5.8 
1950 2065 22.5 4706 51.4 1975 21.6 416 4.5 
1951 1832 22.7 4160 51.6 1634 20.3 432 5.4 
1952 1428 18.8 3884 51.0 1769 23.3 5 30 6.9 
1953 1383 15.6 4317 48.7 2375 26.8 787 8.9 
1954 1640 14.8 5640 50.9 2946 26.5 860 7.8 
1955 1785 16.3 5412 49.3 2916 26.6 856 7.8 
1956 2032 16.0 6152 48.4 3431 27.1 1071 8.5 
1957 2001 14.6 6699 48.8 3847 28.0 1192 8.6 
1958 2028 13.5 7015 46.9 4456 29.8 1465 9.8 
1959 1841 13.1 6664 47.4 4202 29.9 1346 9.6 
1960 1688 10.9 6884 44.6 5078 32.9 1795 11.6 
1961 1903 11.1 7378 43.2 5725 33.5 2069 12.2 
1962 1647 10.4 6700 42.5 5425 34.4 1910 12.7 
1963 1296 9.0 5781 40.2 5115 35.6 2192 14.2 
* 
Source 
Inc. 
: The Failure Record Through 1963— Dun and Bradstreet, 
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Distribution of Business Failures by Size of Liability, 1934-1963* 
LIABILITIES OVER NET WORTH OF BUSINESS FAILURES (1934-1963) 15 
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The majority of the failures are in the $5,000-25,000 range 
with 90 percent being under a $100,000 liability figure. But to 
conclude from this data that small businesses fail due to finan-
cial inaccessibility would be to ignore the main point. More 
than 50 percent of the failures are relatively new concerns whose 
primary lack is experience and business know-how. The operator 
of a gasoline service station does not fail primarily for want of 
funds. He fails because of poor location, or an overly expen-
sive lease, or lack of mechanical aptitude, or because he does 
not know how to serve the public, or he is unwilling to put in 
the necessary hours. 
It is not the unavailability of funds that will cause a 
business to fold, as can be seen from Chart II, wherein the 
growth of a concern and the sources of funds to meet the needs 
is shown. But these fund sources would not be forthcoming to 
risk the amount, if the concern exhibits utter lack of planning 
and managerial inability. 
To be sure, if business had more capital, they would be able 
to withstand greater losses—and if this thesis could be extended 
indefinitely, there would be no need for anyone ever to give up. 
It is argued that, because of insufficient capital, the small 
operator cannot stand a set-back. If he guesses wrong on one 
important deal, he can be wiped out. The big business, on the 
other hand, can take a licking, tighten its belt and carry on. 
Be that as it may, it is not so much the fact that lack of funds 
may have caused a failure that we are considering here, as it is 
the conditions that made possible such a lack to cause it. 
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THE 'WHERE' AND 'WHEN' OF SMALL BUSINESS BORROWING* 
NEED FOR FUNDS 
For production development, 
promotion, plant modernization 
Company needs permanent working 
capital, accounts receivable 
and increase of inventory more 
rapid than accounts payable. 
Additional plant and equipment 
required to keep production 
capacity up to sales level. 
For product improvement, 
establishing channels of dis-
tribution, working capital, 
plant and equipment. 
*Source: Denver Research Institute: University of Denver. 
CHART II 
source 
of 
Funds 
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FAILURES BY TYPE OF INDUSTRY 
Business Failures in 1960 and 1961 * 
TABLE III 
1961 1960 
Line of industry ^ ^ ^ 
No. Liabilities No. Liabilities 
1. Manufacturing 2825 325, 282 2612 289, 635 
2. Wholesale trade 1734 158, 465 1473 107, 156 
3. Retail trade 8292 333, 043 7386 241, 094 
4. Construction 2752 193, 005 2607 201, 369 
5. Commercial service 1472 80, 328 1367 99, 376 
17075 15445 
* 
Source: Bankers Monthly, 1962, Vol. 79. 
The breakdown of failures by industries (Chart III) shows 
that more than fifty percent are attributed to retail trade, 
thus emphasizing the proneness to high mortality of small busi-
ness. 
Among small retailers, surveys of typical operating costs 
indicate that as much as ten percent of the sales income goes 
to support the proprietor and his family. A retailer doing an 
annual volume of $50,000 may draw $5,000 or so to live, and be 
hard put to ge below that figure in the event of sudden drop in 
sales. Hence the small business is less flexible than the larger 
company in tailoring expenses to sales. 
Breakdown of Business Failures (1952-63) Industry Wise* 
TABLE IV 
Line of Industry 
1952 1953 1954 1955 
Year 
1956 
1952-1963 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
Manufacturing 1581 1857 2282 2202 2285 2411 2680 2465 2612 2825 2575 2409 
Wholesale trade 748 933 1132 1164 1207 1236 1431 1387 1473 1734 1613 1510 
Retail trade 3833 4381 5491 5339 6341 6895 7514 6873 7386 8292 7552 6681 
Construction 838 1024 1305 1404 1834 2105 2162 2064 2607 2752 2703 2401 
Commercial Service 611 667 876 860 1019 1092 1177 1264 1367 1472 1339 1373 
7611 8862 11086 10969 12686 13739 14964 14053 15445 17075 15782 14374 
*Source: Collected from Dun's Review and Modern Industry, February Issues. 
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CHART III 
From Table IV 
TOTAL NUMBER OF BUSINESS FAILURES AND 
BREAKDOWN BY INDUSTRIES (AVERAGE OF 1952-63) 
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Retail Trade 
An Examination of 141 failures in retail trade in one week 
in 1957 revealed more than 250 causes of failures. They in-
cluded increased family expenses due to ill-health, starting 
out with too much borrowed money, heavy expenses of moving to 
new location, trying to grow too fast, lack of adequate finan-
cial records, underestimating cost of business, overestimating 
inventory requirements, losses in training new personnel, 
excessive advertising costs, under-insured losses from burglaries 
and fires, inadequate parking facilities, and keen competition. 
Other than these internal factors, mention may be made of 
some external factors. Today we are in the throes of a revolu-
tion; suburban shopping centers compete with the downtown 
merchant and with other shopping centers. Parking is a new 
hazard. Discount houses pioneer in new methods of cutting costs, 
grocery chain stores are diversifying, selling unrelated items 
such as hosiery, work clothes and appliances. These conditions 
work to narrow operating margins at a time when the smaller 
specialized merchant is fighting rising costs. 
A close parallelism is observed between business failures 
and automobile accidents. Some accidents occur because of bad 
weather, just as failures increase in bad times. Cars are 
getting faster and accidents occur due to excessive speed; 
likewise some business failures are due to a faster pace of 
business, and men at the helm lag behind in steering the business 
on the right path. Some wrecks occur due to faulty equipment 
23 
and so do some failures. 
However, the majority of the accidents can be attributed 
to deficiencies in the driver. His lack of knowledge of how to 
handle his vehicle, how to recognize his limitations and how to 
obey the rules of the road are mainly responsible for his 
ceasing to exist. Similarly the root cause of business failures 
is the individual business man who refuses to recognize the 
hazards of improper bookkeeping, improper merchandising, 
improper understanding of costs and inventory, poor credit 
practice, excessive salaries and dividends and improper financing 
methods. 
Manufacturing 
Based on available information in the records of Dun and 
Bradstreet, Inc., the lack of experience factor took its toll on 
94% of 2825 failures in manufacturing in 1961 (Table III). In 
well over half the failures, this lack of experience became 
apparent through inadequate sales. The second most frequent 
cause was competitive weakness, while a significant number 
failed because of receivables difficulties and excessive fixed 
assets. 
Of the concerns failing in this category, the furniture 
industry recorded 289/10,000 operating businesses. Transporta-
tion equipment registered a failure rate of 231, while leather 
and shoe concerns had 183 failures per 10,000 concerns. 
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Wholesale Trade 
Inexperience again accounted for 92 percent of failures 
among wholesalers. This became apparent in the form of inade-
quate sales, receivables difficulties, etc. In about 70 percent 
of the cases competitive weakness and inventory difficulties 
took a fairly large toll. 
Construction 
Many of the problems of the construction industry differ 
from those of manufacturing, Wholesalers and retailers. Yet 
the underlying cause of failure in 90.3 percent of the cases 
cited was lack of experience. Competitive weakness was the 
reason for 27.7 percent of failures. Heavy operating expenses 
played a more dominant role in construction failures accounting 
for 16.6 percent of the total. Receivables difficulties, 
basically due to inexperience in the handling of this phase of 
business, took a toll of an additional 16.5 percent, while 
excessive investments in fixed assets was the apparent cause of 
4.7 percent of the failures falling in this category. 
Commercial Service 
In commercial services 90.1 percent of failures are the 
result of the various forms of inexperience on the part of 
management. It shows up in the form of inadequate sales in just 
over half of the reported failures. Competitive weakness is 
cited by 19.0 percent, while a comparatively large 12.7 percent 
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of the failures are due to excessive fixed assets. Heavy 
operating expenses and receivables difficulties together account 
for 13.5 percent. 
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FAILING AGE OF BUSINESS CONCERNS 
It is well known that in general the younger the business 
firm the more vulnerable it is to failure, the probability of 
survival increasing with age. The first few years of operating 
a business are usually more hazardous because that is the testing 
period of the ability, stamina and managerial capacities of the 
owner. This high susceptibility to succumb is clearly indicative 
of the fact, beyond a shadow of doubt, that incompetent and in-
experienced individuals will be eliminated. Due to the hap-
hazard management their resources tend to evaporate and with no 
renewal of funds they have no alternative but to close the doors. 
In a survey in the second quarter of 1946 the results show 
(Chart IV) that only 2/3 lasted 1 year, only 1/2 lasted 2 years 
and less than 1/3 lasted as long as 5 years. 
During 1950, 9162 failures occurred as per Dun and Bradstreet 
Reference Book. Of these 4.2 percent started in business during 
1950, 18.2 percent during 1949, 17.5 percent in 1948, 14.4 percent 
in 1947, and 13.9 percent during 1946. Only 1/5 of 1 percent 
started in business before 1900. 
The failing age of business since 1945 onwards is shown in 
Chart V and Table V, which depicts the percentage of businesses 
in operation for less than 5 years, 6-10 years and over 10 years. 
The high rate of failures under 5 years of operation is suggestive 
of the fact that, in this period of rapid development, should 
there be any laxity on the part of the management to keep pace 
with the changing trend, the inevitable failure results. 
27 
Scientific planning and accurate forecasting of results have 
become imperative for the success of a concern unlike a couple 
of decades ago when management could easily get by with guess-
work. 
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CHART IV 
SURVEY OF SECOND QUARTER OF 1946 
Years - Age of Firm 
PERCENTAGE SURVIVAL OF BUSINESS CONCERNS IN 1946 
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Trend in Age of Business Failures, 1945-1963.* 
TABLE V 
Year 
5 years 
Percent in Business 
6-10 yrs over 10 yrs 
1945 59.1 19.8 21.1 
1946 71.8 13.9 14.3 
1947 77.6 13.3 9.1 
1948 76.5 12.5 11.0 
1949 74.6 14.5 10.9 
1950 65.2 19.0 12.8 
1951 63.2 23.5 13.3 
1952 59.9 25.8 14.3 
1953 58.5 26.7 14.8 
1954 57.2 27.3 15.5 
1955 56.6 26.0 17.4 
1956 58.6 23.1 18.3 
1957 58.9 21.8 19.3 
1958 57.2 21.4 21.4 
1959 57.1 22.3 20.6 
1960 58.6 20.8 20.6 
1961 56.2 22.4 21.4 
1962 55.4 22.2 22.4 
1963 55.4 21.7 22.9 
*Source: The Failure Record Through 1963, Dun and Bradstreet, 
Inc. 
PERCENTAGE SURVIVAL OF BUSINESS CONCERNS (1945-1963) 
CHART V 
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CAUSES OF BUSINESS FAILURES 
Since 1857 Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. has collected informa-
tion of business failures with the purpose of informing credit 
grantors as to the frequency of failures as an element in 
appraising credit risks. 
When a concern is reported to have failed. Dun and Brad-
street makes an investigation of the circumstances surrounding 
the failure. Along with the principal of the business, banks, 
suppliers and competitors are also interviewed in order to form 
an objective opinion as to the cause of failure. 
The pattern which most frequently emerges from these 
investigations is one in which the failure can be traced directly 
to a clearly identifiable human weakness. It may be lack of 
know-how, lack of adaptability, or lack of disciplinary qualities 
that make for proper financial management. 
The causes, in general break down into four categories: 
1. The competitive pressure of an increasing number of concerns 
going into business. 
2. The increasing pressure of the cost price squeeze, in which 
all businesses find themselves. 
3. Ever-changing patterns in consumer demands and corollary 
changes in the business methods required to cope with them. 
4. Lack of managerial capacity and judgement. 
The high levels of sales and good times encourage many 
inexperienced people to start business, in the hope of learning 
as they go, while capitalizing on the prevailing general
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perity. They ignore the fact that it is the ability of the 
individual rather than the economic conditions that counts most 
in making a business operation successful. 
The statistics compiled by Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. classify 
the causes of business failures in the following categories as 
being the underlying cause for a concern's demise. 
Neglect 
Inability of principal or principals to give full time and 
complete attention to the operation of the business. This con-
dition may be due to bad habits such as drinking or gambling, 
to ill-health or death, to marital or family problems, or to 
other factors such as employment. 
Fraud 
Dishonest practices on the part of principal or principals 
such as use of a misleading name, release of a false financial 
statement, a premeditated overbuy or irregular disposal of 
assets. 
Disaster 
Operation of business severely disabled by fire, flood, 
burglary, employees fraud, strike or other. 
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Inexperience 
Lack of Experience in a Particular Line 
If the principal or principals had been in the present line 
of business for less than three years either with the subject 
or in a previous connection. 
Lack of Managerial Experience 
If the principal or principals had less 
managerial experience with the subject or in 
nection. 
Unbalanced Experience 
If the principal or principals lacked experience in the 
operational divisions of business, such as sales, finance, 
purchasing or production. 
Incompetence 
If all experience factors were present or the management 
had been in control for three years or more prior to failure, 
incompetence is indicated. 
When inexperience or incompetence is the classification, 
it is frequently necessary to designate two underlying causes. 
Bearing on this double choice of underlying causes, are the 
facts that 
a) declining or inadequate sales are apt to be followed by 
proportionately heavy operating expenses, and 
b) Receivables or inventory difficulties, or excessive fixed 
than three years of 
a previous con-
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assets frequently result in unfavorable operating expense figures^ 
Excessive Liabilities 
The most obvious manifestation of managerial incompetence, 
inexperience or neglect is the growth in liabilities of a busi-
ness enterprise to a point where they have become distinctly 
excessive. A business becomes financially involved when its 
liabilities increase rapidly, when invoices cannot be paid 
according to terms, when interest on a funded debt cannot be 
met, and when the current or funded debt cannot be paid or re-
funded at maturity. Because these financial obligations cannot 
be met, a compromise settlement is reached, or a petition in 
bankruptcy is finally filed either by the management of a busi-
ness or by its creditors. 
Managerial Incapacity 
The history of all such cases would show that the liabilities 
had become heavy due to some one or several management decisions, 
or because of the lack of aggressiveness or preparedness to meet 
competitive conditions and practices. Possibly the management in 
immediately preceding years had drawn excessive salaries, per-
mitted excessive dividends or withdrawals, operated at a loss, 
speculated in merchandize or had onerous funded debts and exces-
sive fixed charges. In other words along with excessive 
^Receivables difficulties include situations where receiva-
bles are over heavy, past due or uncollectable. 
Inventory difficulties include situation where inventories are 
heavy, slow moving or unsalable. 
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liabilities there would be found underlying managerial decisions 
which had brought the enterprise to its final resting place. 
Another manifestation of managerial incapacity is having 
heavy fixed assets. This condition at the same time indicates 
a lack of net working capital and burdens the operating account 
with more than its normal share of yearly depreciation. Such a 
condition in a manufacturing enterprise results from the desire 
of the management to expand the capacity and the facilities of 
the concern generally during a period of good business, when the 
business cycle turns, the concern is distressed by idle plant 
capacity. Such a situation is doubly dangerous when new con-
struction and additions to plant capacity are financed with 
borrowed funds. 
The same situation occurs with retail establishments when 
large sums are spent to improve the front or the inside furnishments 
of a store, when an addition is made to an old store, and 
when new units are taken over either by purchase or lease. This 
condition may also be brought about by the management which 
at an earlier date had maintained a satisfactory relationship 
between fixed assets and tangible net worth. 
Excessive Inventories 
Managerial incompetence is found in excessive inventories. 
This condition may be brought about by the manufacturing or dis-
tribution of too many products or lines for the size of the 
business? by speculation in merchandise, i.e., by buying heavily 
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in anticipation of a rise in prices which often fail to materi-
alize; by poor judgment of future markets, i.e., overbuying? 
by the production or handling of a product which is off-style or 
not in public demand? by unknowingly having prices which are 
competitively high? and by failure to keep the stocks neat and 
up-to-date. 
An executive who would speculate in merchandise, who would 
purchase heavily in excess of his reasonable needs and whose 
business would subsequently become bankrupt in the ensuing drop 
in wholesale prices would certainly lack both knowledge and fore-* 
sight. The drop in wholesale prices would not have been the 
cause of the failure, but merely the means through which the 
inexperience of the management became evident. The fundamental 
error was in deciding to pile up a heavy inventory far in excess 
of reasonable needs. 
Table VI gives the percentage breakdown of the causes of 
failures in 1963. The majority of failures are in the inexper-
ienced category which is evidenced by the high percentage in 
lack of experience in the line, lack of managerial experience, 
unbalanced experience and incompetence. These four factors sum 
to a total of over 90 percent of the total failures. 
Considering the underlying causes of business failures 
indicated in Table VI brings to the mind a statement made by 
William J. Riley in the beginning of his book—The law of intelligent 
action, that, "It is commonly recognized and accepted 
that brain power is the first and most important element in the 
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birth, the intelligent conduct, and the successful survival of 
any business enterprise, more important than money, material or 
sheer physical labor," And too, after 17 years as a referee in 
bankruptcy in Manhattan, New York, Irwin Kurtz in his article, 
"I got 'em when they are broke" in the January 21, 1950 issue 
of Saturday Evening Post said: "Dishonest bankrupts are an 
exception rather than a rule. Put in another way most bankrupts 
are honest but incompetent." 
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TABLE VI 
Classification of Causes of Business Failures in 1963 Based on Opinions of Informed Creditors 
and Information in Dun and Bradstreet Credit Reports 
Percent 
Manu- Whole-
fact. saler 
Re- Con- Commer- Total Underlying Causes 
tail- struc- cial Con-
er tion Service cerns 
Apparent Causes 
Manu- Whole-
fact. saler 
Re- Con-
tail- struc-
er tion 
Commer- Total 
cial Con-
Service cerns 
1.8 3.0 2.6 3.2 3.7 2.7 Neglect Due to Bad Habits 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.6 
Poor Health 1.1 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.3 
Marital difficulties 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.4 
Other 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 
2.1 3.3 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.8 Fraud On the Misleading Name 0.1 — — — 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 
part of False Financial Statement 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.3 
the prin- Premeditated Overbuy 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 
cipals Irregular Disposal of Assets 1.3 1.7 0.7 1.0 0.8 1.0 
reflected 
by 
Other 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 
6.5 7.5 11.8 7.2 8.2 9.4 Lack of Experience Evidenced Inadequate Sales 50.1 46.1 49.2 28.3 41.6 44.8 
17.9 
in Line by in- Heavy Operating Expenses 9.0 4.6 2.7 28.2 8.8 8.8 
16.0 20.8 23.0 20.3 20.1 Lack of Managerial ability Receivables Difficulties 15.4 21.4 6.3 16.8 6.0 11.1 
19.1 21.2 
Experience to avoid Inventory Difficulties 6.3 12.3 9.8 1.8 1.5 7.4 
18.8 20.5 18.3 19.3 Unbalanced condi- Excessive Fixed Assets 7.2 3.8 4.2 3.9 9.9 5.2 
50.8 
Experience tions Poor Location 1.1 1.8 7.2 0.7 3.6 4.2 
46.8 39.9 39.3 40.3 42.4 Incompetence which re- Competitive Weakness 18.3 21.8 23.7 19.6 23.0 21.8 
sulted in Other 2.9 3.0 2.5 3.2 3.9 2.9 
0.9 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.8 Disaster Some of Fire 0.5 0.1 0.5 — — — 0.3 0.4 
these oc- Flood 0.0 
currences Burglary 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
could Employees' Fraud 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
have beer Strike 0.1 0.1 0.1 
provided Other 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.2 
against 
through 
insurance Percent of Total Failures 16.8 10.5 46.4 16.7 9.6 100 
0.9 1.5 3.6 4.9 7.1 3.5 Reason Unknown 
Because some failures are due to a combination of causes, the totals of these 
2409 1510 6681 2401 1373 14374 Number of Failures columns exceed the totals of the corresponding columns on the left. 
$231506 $115941 $44808 $96357 $64897 $94100 Average Liabilities/ 
Failure 
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EXTERNAL FACTOR: WHOLESALE PRICES 
One important factor external to the working of a concern is 
Wholesale Commodity Prices which needs to be analyzed. There are 
indications that fluctuations in wholesale commodity prices have 
a greater effect than most other factors in aggravating an al-
ready unsound financial condition resulting from managerial in-
competence. 
Business failures generally decrease when wholesale prices 
rise and increase when wholesale prices decline. During the 
years from 1926-1932 when wholesale prices were drifting lower 
and lower, Dun's failure index*** went up and up reaching an all 
time high of 154 in 1932. Then as prices went up, slowly but 
steadily to 1937, failures dropped lower and lower reaching 
46/10,000 concerns, in that year. As the wholesale price level 
reacted down in 1938 and 1939, the failures crept up. Likewise 
during the war years as prices increased failures decreased. 
Finally the all-time low of failures was reached in 1945 where 
there were only 810 business failures for the entire year giving 
a figure of 4/10,000 concerns. 
As prices increased following the end of the war, the index 
of business failures increased. These increases, however, were 
fairly moderate until 1948 and 1949 when the rate of failures 
jumped from 20 to 34. For 1949 the index of wholesale prices 
made its first decline since 1939. This negative correlation 
^Failure index: number of failures per 10,000 operating 
concerns as listed in Dun and Bradstreet Reference Book. 
CHART VI 
INDEX OF BUSINESS FAILURES AND WHOLESALE PRICES, 1926-1949 
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appears in Chart VI. 
There are more peaks and valleys in the movement of the 
index of failures since its start in 1870 than in the movement of 
the index of wholesale prices. There is, however, some general 
inverse relationship between these two indexes. For specific 
isolated years such as 1879, 1880, 1929, 1946, 1947, 1948 they 
move in the same direction. On the other hand the two lowest 
points in the failure index occurred in 1919 and 1945 both years 
in which tremendous increase in purchasing media has been 
reflected in the upswing of wholesale prices toward two of the 
greatest peaks of pure inflation. 
The inverse correlation which exists between the level of 
wholesale commodity prices and the number of yearly business 
failures would seem to be quite normal. A very substantial 
number of the approximately 2,550,000 commercial and business 
enterprises of the country listed in the January 1950 Reference 
Book of Dun and Bradstreet are marginal enterprises. They are 
the concerns which had been organized with insufficient capital 
which had taken losses for several years notwithstanding the high 
level of business activity which had paid excessive salaries, 
declared excessive withdrawals or dividends, incurred heavy 
liabilities, or were carrying inflated receivables or heavy 
inventories. Any moderate ailment will eliminate many of these 
marginal concerns from the field of business competition. 
There is no one factor which has such an immediate effect 
upon the well-being of a business enterprise as the level of 
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prices of the raw materials which a manufacturing concern uses, 
or the level of wholesale prices of the products which a whole-
sale or retail concern handles. If the general level of the 
prices of the product, which a concern handles, goes up, its 
own selling prices may be raised and an unexpected profit thereby 
obtained on the inventory purchased at lower prices and already 
on hand. Conversely, when the prices fall, the inventory on 
hand must be marked down in order that it can be sold competi-
tively, and a loss taken in that process, a process which ends 
only in oblivion for many marginal concerns. 
That is how the level of Wholesale Commodity Prices em-
phasizes the incapacities of operating managements. Businesses 
which are guided efficiently by skilled management, which kept 
liabilities, fixed assets, receivables and inventories within 
reasonable bounds take the rise and fall of prices in the same 
powerful stride. In occasional years losses are assumed, but 
such concerns rarely become financially distressed. 
At the present time the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the 
Department of Labor compiles a Wholesale Price Index, weekly, 
monthly, and yearly designed to measure average changes in com-
modity prices in primary markets in U. S. From 1931 to 1937, 
there were 784 different commodity series used in compiling this 
index, from 1938-1945, from 813 to 890 different commodities and 
at present 860. 
Separate index have been compiled monthly for 10 major 
commodity groups since 1890, and for 49 subgroups since 1913. 
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The 10 major commodity groups are the following. Food products, 
building material, chemicals and allied products, hides and 
leather products, house furnishings goods, metals and metal pro-
ducts, textile products, farm products, fuel and lighting and 
miscellaneous. 
With minor exceptions, the indexes of wholesale prices and 
business failures move in opposite directions to each other. 
Since 1900 there have been three peaks in the broad cyclical 
fluctuations in the number of business failures, 22,156 in 1915, 
23,676 in 1922, and the all time high 31,822 in 1932. Similar 
peaks in the failure rate per 10,000 concerns occurred in these 
same years, although there has been a fluctuating upward trend 
in the number of listed business concerns. 
Since the all time low in 1945 the number and rate of fail-
ures have increased each year. Notwithstanding this steady up-
ward trend over the past four years, the number of failures and 
the failure rate for 1949 were strikingly low. This fact is 
evident from the following comparison of the average number of 
failures and average rate of failures for successive decades 
from 1900 onwards. 
The 9247 failures which occurred in 1949 were materially 
lower than any of the ten-year period average failure figures 
from 1900 to the present time with the exception of the decade 
1940-1949. They were 23.3 percent lower than the average from 
1900-1909, 36.5 percent lower than 1910-1919 and 55.0 percent 
lower than 1920-1929. Moreover the failure for 1949 were actually 
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34.8 percent lower than for the fifty year average of 1900-1949. 
TABLE VII 
Average Business Failures Per Decade (1900-49) 
Year 
Average number 
of failures 
Average failures 
per 10,000 
1900-1909 12020 90 
1910-1919 14530 90 
1920-1929 20443 98 
1930-1939 17736 86 
1940-1949 5919 26 
1900-1949 14130 78 
1949 9247 34 
A comparison of the failure rate for 1949 with the average 
for these earlier decades is even more impressive. The 1949 
rate of 34/10,000 listed concerns was 62.3 percent lower than 
the average for 1900-1909, and 1910-1919, 65.3 percent lower 
than 1920-1929, and 56.4 percent lower than the fifty year 
average of 1900-1949. From 1900 through 1942 the lowest failure 
rate of 37/10,000 occurred in 1919, and this was somewhat higher 
than that of 1949. 
Since 1942 there has been an economic atmosphere and en-
vironment which has been conducive to large sales, substantial 
profits, a high level of employment, increase in hourly wages, 
substantial expenditures for new plants and equipment and high 
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personal savings all of which were brought about by the pent 
up demand of the war and by rising wholesale prices. 
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CASE-STUDIES 
The statistics of the causes of business failures and 
especially the susceptibility of small business to failure com-
piled in the foregoing sections tend to eliminate any doubts of 
other possible internal factors leading to the failure of a 
business. 
However, in any study the use of statistics makes the ap-
proach an impersonal one. To a skeptical individual it does not 
provide a tangible feeling except that he is dealing with a 
set of numbers rather than the actual situation as to what has 
occurred in reality. Hence to include a few case-studies would 
definitely prove the point, that inefficient and incapable 
management are the basis for the collapse of a concern, with a 
complete certainty. 
Analysis of Bankruptcy Records 
An analysis of bankruptcy records is cited, prepared by the 
Geroge Washington University as a research report. The 60 cases 
of business failures which were analyzed from the court records 
represents outright financial failures of business enterprises. 
The cases were chosen so as to include a reasonable representa-
tion of the basic type of business activity. The sample reflects 
roughly the frequency with which the types of business activity 
were found in the court records. 
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Classification 
Type Number Percent 
Trade 40 66.7 
Manufacturing 13 21.7 
Service 7 11.6 
60 1 0 0 . 0 
The numbers of different types of organization at the time 
of failure of the 60 firms are quite different from what they 
were at the times of origin. 41 of 60 were initially established 
as proprietorship. 13 of these were succeeded by incorporations. 
4 of them originating as partnerships were incorporated. Only 9 
of 60 firms were initially established as corporations. 
Among the 17 firms which changed organizations, the records 
examined did not reveal any evidence of insolvency of failure at 
the time of change. However, failure occurred within 2 years 
after the change for 13 of the 17 firms, with 4 remaining in 
business for 3 or more years after the change. While the records 
did not reveal that incorporation was a prelude to bankruptcy, 
it seems likely that incorporation may have been influenced by 
early signs of poor operating results. 
One out of every 3 business included in the group failed 
in its first 2 years of operation. 3 out of 4 had failed by the 
end of the seventh year leaving only 1 in 4 to survive longer 
than 7 years. Table VIII shows the length of time in operation 
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for the 60 cases. 
TABLE VIII 
Length of operation 
in months Number Percent 
12 or fewer 13 21.6 
13-24 8 13.3 
25-36 4 6.7 
37-60 12 20.0 
61-84 8 13.0 
85 or more 15 25.0 
60 100.0 
The firms were small in terms of sales volume, not over a 
million dollars in sales. All are believed to have been small 
or very small in terms of employment. 71 percent had 10 or 
fewer full time employees, while the largest known employment 
was 35 persons. It is extremely unlikely that the employment 
size of 12 firms where data were not available would have 
exceeded SBA standards. 
Only 31 of the 40 Dun and Bradstreet reports provided 
information on prior experience of the owners. Only 5 or 12.5 
percent of the owners had less than 6 years of prior experience. 
13 or 32.5 percent had more than 21 years prior business experi-
ence. Quality of experience could not be determined, ll of the 
owners, managers on whom credit reports were obtainable had 
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failed previously, 5 had failed in the same kind of business, 
3 in related business and 3 in other kinds of business. 
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MANAGEMENT PRACTICES OF THE CASE-STUDY 
Evaluation of the management practices of the bankruptcy 
cases was limited by the interpretation which could be made from 
the court records. Almost no information comparable to the data 
on the problems and the use of management assistance of the 
group could be obtained. Information on accounting records, 
accounts receivable, credit and capital structure give some 
indication of the difficulties which the firms encountered, and 
of their inadequate use of available services. 
No business large or small can be managed effectively with-
out some fairly definite accounting concepts and at least a 
simple set of records. Those records will increase in importance 
as the business grows in size, but from the beginning, the rela-
tionships prevailing between income and expenses and assets and 
liabilities must be understood and known. 
Small businesses have long been notorious for poor record-
keeping, and an inadequate appreciation of good accounting 
practices. This situation is due in part to insufficient man-
power and in part to the fact that the daily grind of managing 
other phases is more pressing and seems more important. 
The records examined revealed evidence of poor accounting 
practices in all of the 60 firms. In some of them, court 
appointed accountants could not conduct an audit. In some check-
stubs wer the only accounting record of the business. Other 
evidence of poor accounting practices resulting from small size 
or poor management practices is shown in Tables IX to XII. 
TABLE IX 
Persons Keeping Records in Bankruptcy Cases 
Individual keeping 
records Number Percent 
Owner 23 
38.4 
Employee 14 23.3 
Independent accountant 21 35.0 
None 2 3.3 
60 100.0 
TABLE X 
Number of Financial Statements Prepared by 
Bankruptcy Cases 
Number of Statements Number Percent 
None 34 57.6 
1 17 28.8 
2 1 1.7 
3 2 3.4 
4 1 1.7 
12 4 
6.
8 
59 1 0 0 . 0 
No information available in one case. 
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TABLE XI 
Frequency of Inventory/year by Bankruptcy 
Cases 
Frequency of inventory Number Percent 
None 27 4.5 
1 22 36.7 
2 5 8.3 
4 2 3.3 
5 or more 4 6.7 
60 100.0 
TABLE XII 
Accounts Receivables as Percent of Total Assets 
for the Bankruptcy Cases 
Acts, receivables % 
Total Assets 
of Number Percent 
0 12 20.8 
1-10 8 31.0 
11-20 5 8.6 
21-30 5 8.6 
31-40 6 10.4 
41-50 4 6.9 
51-60 5 8.6 
61-70 1 1.7 
71-80 2 3.4 
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In 23 cases the owner kept his own books, more than half or 
34 firms prepared no financial statements while only 4 prepared 
such statements monthly. 
34 firms never had their books audited and only 22 firms 
had outside auditors. Most of the firms were in the retail and 
wholesale business, yet 27 never took inventories of their stock. 
In 18 firms the accounts receivable as a percent of total assets 
were 10 percent or less. The 12 firms showing zero receivables 
were retail concerns dealing strictly on cash basis. 
Among the 60 firms only 8 factored or otherwise assigned 
accounts receivables. The firms that did assign receivables 
characteristically displayed a high ratio of accounts receivable 
to total assets. This is not true of those firms that did not 
assign receivables. Some had high ratios and some low. The 
variability of these ratios among the firms that did not assign 
receivables was extreme. For example, one firm had total assets 
of $14,440 of which $10,956 was accounts receivables; another had 
assets of $5,452 of which only $113 was accounts receivables. 
The records indicate that there was very little supervision 
of accounts receivables and little control over amount of terms 
of credit. There was no evidence of use of collection agencies 
or credit investigation services. Record-keeping was slip-shod 
and haphazard. For example, one proprietor recorded the accounts 
receivable on a ruled tablet and allowed his customers to 
remember how much they owed him. 
Information was not available to determine the percent of 
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bad accounts, or the age of accounts that firm had at the time of 
failure. However, uncollectables accounted for a large part of 
the accounts receivable as measured by settlement liquidation. 
For example, a retail furniture store listed $12,000 as accounts 
receivable, constituting 30 percent of total assets. These 
receivables were sold by the trustee in bankruptcy for $100. 
Information on capital and net worth was complete on only 
16 of 60 cases. All of the 16 were under capitalized. In 15 of 
the 16 cases, capitalization was based apparently on the cost 
theory with little or no regard for future needs for capital. 
Analysis of the information, suggests the existence of a 
pattern of debt accumulation in relation to the life of the 
business. Among the 60 firms, in those that failed in the first 
year, debt began to accumulate at the outset, among those that 
failed by the third year, the period of debt accumulation was 
roughly the latter half of the life of business. In those that 
remained in business for five or more years, the last 2 or 3 
years of operation was the period of heaviest debt. 
Cash in most cases was inadequate right at the start of 
business. The cash position also weakened from three principal 
causes: 
a) Indiscriminate withdrawls by management 
b) Excessive inventories 
c) Increasing uncollectable receivables. 
Diminishing cash, declining sales, excess inventories, in-
creasing uncollectable receivables and monthly debt accumulation 
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were factors for the most part ignored by management. There 
were some firms that were doomed from the start, but for the 
majority, if the danger signals had been recognized and counsel 
sought, failure would have, in all probability, been averted. 
When these signals appeared, no action was taken to correct 
the situation. There was no evidence in the records examined 
that any owner asked for or received business advice prior to 
bankruptcy proceedings. There were, of course, those firms 
which requested help in the form of loans, but there was no indi-
cation that the requested loan constituted part of a deliberate 
planned action on the part of management to readjust to cope 
with the cause of difficulty. 
A few more case studies obtained from research reports of 
studies conducted by University of Iowa further strengthen the 
hypothesis of failures due to mismanagement. These studies 
have two groups of firms, one out-of-business firms and one in-
business firms dealing in the same line. It is easy to observe 
from these cases, the managerial shortcomings which led ultimately 
to their failure. In the cases an attempt is made to determine 
explicitly how management policies and practices in unsuccessful 
firms differed from those in successful firms of the same size 
and in the same economic area. 
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Poultry Processing 
There are two out-of-business firms and two in-business 
firms. Both of the out-of-business firms were partnerships. 
In one of these unsuccessful firms there was considerable fric-
tion among the partners. The apparent cause of this friction 
was that one of the partners was "a playboy" who did "almost no 
work" and withdrew much of the firms funds. Over a three year 
period, it was claimed, he outdrew the other partner by over 
$7,000. Ultimately the partnership was declared bankrupt and the 
assets of the firs were sold to satisfy creditors. One of the 
partners lost $17,000 and the other $15,000. 
In the other poultry-processing firm which had failed, the 
partners attempted to borrow the money necessary to convert 
their plant to meet newly required government inspection standards. 
Approximately $65,000 was needed for this purpose. The local 
bank, however, refused to accept the loan because of the poor 
record of past earnings and even poorer earning prospects. The 
firm went out of business with no outstanding debt or accounts 
receivable. The equipment was sold, but returned only ten cents 
on the dollar of its original purchase price. 
The distinctive management differences between these out-of-
business and the two "going concerns" may be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Each of the firms that failed sold a large percentage of its 
product on credit, whereas the other did not. Both of the 
credit-granting firms had some credit-collection problems. 
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2. Whereas the two out-of-business firms processed poultry 
only, the apparently successful firms diversified their product 
line by processing eggs as a secondary product. 
3. The latter firms sold their products to industrial and in-
stitutional users, as well as to individual customers, whereas 
the unsuccessful firms made no effort to enter this market. 
4. Each of the going concerns engaged in a preventive main-
tenance program and lost no production through machine downtime. 
The out-of-business firms, on the other hand, spent large sums 
of money for machine repairs, and lost over 100 man-hours 
annually due to machine breakdowns. 
5. One of the out-of-business firms purchased production mate-
rials largely on a speculative basis. 
6. Neither of the out-of-business firms allocated overhead to 
the cost of the product, and neither used break-even analysis 
of costs and income. 
7. Both of the out-of-business firms borrowed large amounts of 
long-term debt capital for use as working capital. 
Natural Cheese Industry 
In this industry one in-business and one out-of-business 
firm was considered. The in-business firm has operated success-
fully for twenty-five years, whereas the out-of-business firm 
lasted only five years. 
Both firms sold their natural cheese exclusively to whole-
salers. However, the out-of-business establishment sold its 
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entire output on a consignment basis; thus it was necessary that 
the firm carry more working capital since no income was received 
until the wholesalers disposed of the product. 
From a production point of view, the out-of-business firm 
had purchased a large amount of new machinery—far in excess of 
its current requirements. To utilize this equipment more fully, 
additional cream supplies were needed and this forced the 
management to extend cream pickups too far; the management also 
resorted to the use of low-grade cream. In addition, there was 
no adequate system of internal inspection and quality control in 
the plant. The result was that the quality of the firm's pro-
duct deteriorated badly. On one occasion, inspectors of the 
Pure Food and Drug Administration found flies in the cheese pro-
duced by the firm. Sales of the firm fell to lower and lower 
levels. 
The firm became over-extended financially and could not 
meet its current obligations. After its loan application to the 
Small Business Administration was turned down because of "in-
sufficient planning" inadequate collateral" and "poor earning 
prospects", the firm was declared bankrupt and its assets were 
sold at public auction. Its unneeded new equipment, purchased 
on conditional sales contracts, was repossessed. 
In contrast, the ongoing concern (of the same size) is owned 
and managed by a person who obviously knows his business well. 
He is acquainted with officials of the Kraft and Borden organiza-
tions, and has other contracts which help him considerably in 
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marketing his product. He finds it unnecessary to borrow debt 
capital, his short and long-term operations being financed from 
earnings and equity. 
Fluid Milk 
Poor financial management is evident in the case of the 
single out-of-business firm as compared to three active firms. 
The financial records were kept very poorly. No overhead was 
allocated to the cost of the product, nor were break-even analyses 
or budgets of any kind employed. Over a period of fifteen years 
the owner-manager had borrowed $443,000 to meet short-term, 
working capital requirements. His latest attempt to borrow funds, 
obviously, was unsuccessful for reasons of "insufficient financial 
planning". 
Distinct differences also exist in marketing policies and 
practices between this firm and the "going" concerns. Each of the 
latter diversified its product line through the secondary pro-
duction and sale of ice cream, a product with a relatively high 
profit margin, whereas the unsuccessful firm relied solely on its 
market for fluid milk. From an advertising and sales promotion 
point of view, the in-business firms advertised in more media 
and did more in the way of sales promotion with posters, samples, 
booths at the trade shows etc. Whereas the out-of-business firm 
spent an arbitrary amount annually for sales promotion and ad-
vertising, the in-business firms spend a planned amount annually 
for this purpose
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Farm Machinery and Equipment 
There are two out-of-business firms and one in-business 
firm in this group. All of the firms are short line producers; 
one of the out-of-business firms manufactured a manure spreader, 
the second out-of-business firm produced truck hoists for farmers, 
and the still active firm in this industry makes a variety of 
farm implement attachments. 
The business of all three firms was hurt by the fact that 
they did not produce a full line, and exclusive dealing arrange-
ments were being formed by the larger firms that did offer a 
full line of farm machinery and equipment. Jobbers were sym-
pathetic, but became less willing to handle the short-line firms' 
products because of pressures exerted by the larger, full-line, 
national-advertising manufacturers. 
Both of the out-of-business firms, as well as the active 
firm, responded to these conditions by stressing the jobbing and 
repair end of their business. Only one of these three small 
firms, however, managed to survive. 
Managerial difficulties contributing to the demise of the 
two out-of-business firms can be summarized as follows: 
1. One of the firms did no advertising of any kind, and the 
second did less than the firm which is still active. 
2. The non-advertising firm depended on a single key account 
for almost 50 percent of its sales and did not recover full cost 
on repair work. The large account was able to obtain significant 
price concessions. 
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3. This same firm had no minimum order policy or quantity dis-
count schedule like the other two companies. 
4. The second out-of-business firm employed no salesmen. The 
other two firms strengthened their own sales organizations as 
more and more jobbers made exclusive dealer arrangements with 
the larger firms. 
5. The owner-manager of the second out-of-business firm also 
extended a considerable amount of credit on which he had dif-
ficulty collecting. (His credit sales were more than 50 percent 
greater than in the other firms.) He extended credit injudi-
ciously, in an attempt to get as much business as he could. 
6. Neither did the owner of the latter firm have any kind of a 
cost accounting system. He had no idea what his costs were on 
his specialty product or on job orders, and did not know how to 
allocate overhead costs. 
7. The working capital of the second out-of-business firm was 
inadequate. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
That small businesses are more susceptible to failure is 
evident by the size of liabilities of a failing concern and the 
failure break-down by industry. Usually the liabilities of a 
concern when it goes under are 3-4 times the net-worth when the 
concern was in a healthy financial state. 
Chart I shows maximum failures in the $5,000-25,000 and 
25,000-100,000 category indicating that these firms were small 
businesses. Also Chart III shows that more than 50 percent are 
in retail trade, thus once more emphasizing the smallness of the 
business. 
The young failing age of the concern in Chart V and the 
other statistics presented with the case-studies, in the report, 
clearly define the shortcomings as managerial deficiencies in 
the form of inexperience, incompetence, a lack of business 
acumen, and a general disregard to improving or learning or 
obtaining professional counsel and managerial advice. 
Inexperience and incompetence being further sub-classified 
as inadequate sales, heavy operating expenses, receivables dif-
ficulties, inventory difficulties, excessive fixed assets, poor 
location, competitive weakness, etc. 
Ultimately the case-study evaluates the internal strengths 
and weaknesses of individual firms as is seen by comparing the 
healthy and failing concern. 
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This study purports to analyze causes of small business 
failures with a view that survival of small business is essential 
to the growth of the American economy. Without small business 
the corporate giants have no basis on which to stand. Hence 
it is imperative that causes of failure of small business be 
minutely scrutinized and analyzed so that means may be found to 
rectify the shortcomings of a concern which lead to a failure. 
Business failures are defined as distinct from "business 
discontinuances" so as to manifest the managerial lackings, 
rather than other influencing factors and personal gains. 
Essentially, factors influencing decisions by firms to go out of 
business must reflect internal and external business conditions 
with respect to the firm, and in this report, internal business 
conditions are given primary emphasis. 
The liabilities of a failing concern are a very good indica-
tion of its initial and final financial status. Invariably when 
management is incapable, the assets tend to evaporate and 
liabilities tend to snow-ball such that liabilities at the end 
may be 3-4 times its initial net worth. This sometimes leads to 
an erroneous conclusion that lack of funds may have resulted in 
a failure; however, the high percentage of failures in the 
"inexperience" and "incompetence" category prove it otherwise. 
Also the failing age of a concern, which is usually less 
than five years, seems to emphasize the point that managerial 
incapacity is essentially the reason for the early demise. The 
breakdown of failures by industries clearly shows that mostly 
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the small businesses, lacking in experience and business know-
how, are more susceptible to failure. 
The approach to this problem through a statistical analysis 
and case-study methods leave no room for doubts, and especially 
so when comparing the in-business and out-of-business firms, 
where gross violation of good management practices is clearly 
evident. 
